The Maldives’ first multi-party presidential elections of 2008 ended
Gayoom’s thirty year dictatorship and adopted democratic rule.
But,
like many other nascent democracies, the threat exists that Maldives
may not be able to sustain its democracy in its fullest sense.
This is especially true after the
coup orchestrated
by the Maldivian security forces that ousted the first democratically
elected President in February 2012. Added to this is the
political activeness of dictator Gayoom, which in itself tends to heighten the prospect of Maldives falling back to a dictatorship.
As
we head to the second democratic election in Maldives history, I want
to ask: will a popular election alone help foster democracy in Maldives?
Moreover, how could we prevent a full-blown authoritarian reversal with
power back in the hands of Gayoom?
Gayoom’s continuing influence over Maldivian politics cannot be denied. This is not a unique experience for nascent democracies.
Research
has established that legacies of authoritarianism from which
democracies emerge put more direct pressure on democracies than cultural
and economic factors[i].
This kind of pressure from Gayoom’s
legacy the on Maldives’ efforts towards democratic transition has
manifested itself in different ways. Take, for instance, the country’s
political institutions.
During three years of democracy, attempts
by Nasheed’s government to implement reforms needed for the
consolidation of democracy were met with ever increasing obstructions
from Gayoom loyalists within various institutions.
Firstly, the
effort to create an independent judiciary (without which a modern
democracy cannot function) has been entirely undermined by
judges loyal to Gayoom. The Supreme Court bench itself is composed mostly of Gayoom loyalists who share his political ideologies.
It
makes sense to me now that, when Majlis voted on President Nasheed’s
nominations, DRP opposed most of them. Having been in a position to
observe the negotiations closely, I myself believe that Nasheed’s
nominations, opposed by DRP, comprised less biased, more suitable
candidates.
At the time, DRP was Gayoom’s party with a majority in
Parliament. DRP MPs made a habit of rejecting Nasheed’s nominations and
proposing a list of their own instead. They pushed hard to sit certain
individuals—like self-declared Chief Justice Abdulla Saeed, a known
Gayoom-affiliate—on the bench.
With the country facing a
Constitutional void, President Nasheed compromised and nominated the
current bench for Parliament approval.
Aishath Velezenee, a former Member of the Judicial Services Commission has
provided a detailed account of how the process for appointing Supreme Court Judges took place.
The
simple truth that we all know is, Supreme Court decisions have in one
way or the other, benefited Gayoom and his allies. Is it a coincidence
there is yet to be a Supreme Court decision that went against Gayoom or
his allies?
Gayoom loyalists are similarly entrenched within the
security services. Their loyalty to the dear leader had a major role to
play in their mutiny against Nasheed on February 7, facilitating as it
did the controversial transfer of power later that day.
Gayoom has
denied widely circulated reports he was directing the night’s events
from Malaysia. It cannot be denied, however, that he gave a phone
interview to
opposition-controlled media, indirectly encouraging the mutinying police.
It
is no coincidence that after the coup, the head of security services
are all pro-Gayoom loyalists. Now we have a Police Commissioner who
served as the Deputy Commissioner in Gayoom’s regime, a regime well
known for
police brutality and torture.
The
defence minister is a retired Colonel who also served under Gayoom.
Furthermore, a reflection on the events in February 8 last year also
shows that our security forces still continue Gayoom’s legacies.
Police brutality towards
peaceful protesters, a defining characteristic of Gayoom’s regime,
returned to the streets of Male’ with a vengeance, less than 24 hours
after Nasheed’s government was brought to an end. It wasn’t hard to feel
as if we had regressed, before 2008, before democracy.
Independent
institutions play a vital role in consolidation of a democracy.
Unfortunately for the Maldives, Gayoom loyalists are firmly embedded
within, and often dominate, institutions like the Human Rights
Commission, Police Integrity Commission and Civil Service Commission.
Most
individuals comprising these commissions served in Gayoom’s government
and still maintain close ties with him. This is hardly surprising given
that just as with the nomination of Supreme Court justices, here too it
was a DRP-majority Majlis that confirmed or rejected nominees to
commissions.
The loyalty of some independent commissions to Gayoom
was indeed evident from their actions following the police brutality on
February 8. Neither the
Human Rights Commission, nor the Policy Integrity Commission took any firm actions against the misconducts from the security forces.
Gayoom’s
current party, the PPM, is so determined to retain these loyalists
within the independent commissions that it is prepared to disregard even
findings of serious misconduct against such individuals. The ongoing
saga of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chair Mohamed Fahmy is a case in
point.
Parliament’s Independent Institutions Committee found in
favour of a female staff member who accused Fahmy of sexual harassment
and voted to remove him from the post. PPM members fought hard, but in
vain, to save Fahmy. The Supreme Court was then asked to rule on whether
the parliament’s decision was constitutional. Not surprisingly, the
Supreme Court ruled in Fahmy’s favour.
Gayoom’s dictatorial
legacy, entrenched deep within our political system is the main obstacle
to the consolidation of democracy in the Maldives. The 75 year-old
leader’s revived political activeness is further strengthening this
obstacle. Reforms to the judiciary, independent institutions and
security forces are essential if we are to consolidate and sustain
democracy.
[i] See for example, Shin, Doh Chull (1994), ‘On
the third wave of democratization: A synthesis and evaluation of recent
theory and research’, World Politics, 47 (1), 135-70.
Ahmed
Hamdhan is a third-year Bachelor of Arts (Policy Studies and Political
Science) and a student at the Australian National University.
